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ABSTRACT
In this study I first examined whether the cognitive processes (hot versus cold cognition) under‐
lying judgments to traditional moral situations is universal to situations that are morally neutral, and
whether individual differences in cognitive ability moderate these judgments. Second, I tested whether
it was possible to modify the impact of hot versus cold processing systems on judgment deliberation by
shifting the focus of attention during the decision‐making process. I conclude that moral judgment is
not simply the product of cognitive ability and is not sufficiently motivated by hot cognitive experiences
alone. The role of cognitive abilities on moral valuation requires further examination.
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1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a construction worker, and that you and your crew are high on a scaffold

working on a skyscraper. Suddenly, the scaffolding partially collapses. You and several others are hang‐
ing onto a dangling crossbar, but it cannot hold all of your weight. The worker next to you slips off the
crossbar and grabs onto your one free arm. You realize that the entire structure is about to collapse,
and the only way to avoid you and everyone else falling to your deaths is to repeatedly kick your co‐
worker in the stomach and chest until he lets go of your hand and falls to his certain death. This will re‐
move just enough weight that the rest of you can make it to safety before the scaffold collapses. Is it
appropriate for you to kill your co‐worker in order to save yourself and the rest of the crew (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen, 2007)?
Determining whether a situation is moral requires some knowledge of moral normativity, which
is based on an awareness of acceptable socialized behavior (e.g., child development of morals, Kohlberg,
1969; moral foundations, Haidt & Joseph, 2004; religious beliefs, Wahrman, 1981). Further, assessing
whether a behavior in a decidedly moral situation is deemed morally right from wrong is largely subjec‐
tive (Lapsley & Hill, 2008). Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) found that political affiliation predicted the
relevance of moral intuition categories (e.g., harm, justice) when considering the moral valuation of a
statement. In the construction worker example you are asked to consider killing someone (generally
acknowledged as an immoral behavior) in order to save the lives of other people (a desirable outcome).
How does one determine an appropriate course of this action?
Moral judgment theorists currently debate whether moral decisions are primarily the product of
conscious thoughtful reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969), intuition (Haidt, 2001), or a combination of these (Pi‐
zarro & Bloom, 2003). Rationalist Models of moral decision‐making describe a progression of judgment,
such that a morally provocative situation directly leads to a controlled reasoning response, followed by a
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decision or judgment about the situation (Williams, 1967). The model does not ignore the potential
contribution of automatic emotional reactions, and allows for affect to influence judgment indirectly
through reason, but not in all circumstances. In contrast, Haidt (2001) concluded that automatic emo‐
tion‐based intuition guides moral considerations, such that any rationalization is made as a post hoc re‐
sponse. In doing so, he developed the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), and stated that a situation requir‐
ing moral consideration will elicit an intuitive emotional response (e.g., disgust), which will lead to a
judgment about the situation. A thoughtful and controlled reasoning process will then occur in order to
justify the emotions that led to the judgment. Unlike in rationalist models, emotion is required for any
moral judgment to occur.
The majority of studies aimed at distinguishing controlled from automatic cognition have fo‐
cused on written scenarios containing a moral dilemma and a forced‐choice decision for the participant
to select and ultimately to justify. These dilemmas often put the participant in the position of deciding
whether the actor (i.e., person performing the required action) should, in fact, harm or kill another per‐
son (i.e., victim) in order to spare the lives of at least one other person. Investigations into whether
physical contact between actor and victim (personal actions) influence ratings of on acceptability for
such an action find generally that. personal actions (e.g., shoving the victim onto a set of railroad tracks
in order to save the lives of numerous other people), are rated as significantly less morally appropriate
than situations where there is no physical contact (impersonal actions) but the outcome is the
same(Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Using fMRI technology, Green,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen, (2001) found that personal moral dilemmas led to activation
in the medial prefrontal cortex (a brain area associated with emotions), whereas impersonal dilemmas
lead to brain activation in the dorsolateral pre‐frontal cortex (an area associated with controlled
processing (i.e., executive functioning)). Consequently, Greene and colleagues (2001) argued a dual‐
processing model to moral decisions, such that personal dilemmas lead to “hot”, cognition, and thus

3
emotion‐based decisions, whereas impersonal dilemmas allow for “cold” cognitive processing leading to
decisions that are logic‐based. Regarding moral decision making, both hot and cold mechanisms…
Hot and cold reasoning systems (otherwise referred to as Systems 1 and 2, respectively) are ac‐
tive in judgments related to nonmoral decisions as well. Dual‐process theories of general judgment and
decision‐making describe hot cognition as quick, implicit, and automatic (both in activation as well as
processing). It functions from an associative‐based network often relying on heuristics, and is involved
in impression perception (Kahneman & Tversky, 2003). Cold cognition, on the other hand, is an intellec‐
tual and controlled process that requires explicit learning as well as a conscious processing system and
functions from a rule‐based structure (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Johnson‐Laird,
1983; Evans, 1984, 1989; Pollock, 1991; Reber, 1993; Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West,
2000; Kahneman, 2003). Both systems have benefits and drawbacks contingent upon the circumstances
requiring the decision. The hot system is cognitively efficient, necessarily requiring fewer processing
resources than the intentional reasoning processes of the cold system which is resource demanding, and
is advantageous when one is required to make split‐‐second decisions (e.g., shoot a weapon or not;
Payne, Jacoby, & Lambert, 2005), when performing multiple tasks, or when extended task performance
requires both speed and precision (Kahneman, 2003).
Arguably both systems (hot and cold) are engaged ‐‐‐‐The benefits inherent in hot system’s ref‐
lexive responding can become a detriment when speed and accuracy are at odds (cite). The errors of
the hot system can be overcome with the conscious deliberation of the cold system, and because cold
cognition is the more intentional of the two systems it is always involved in reasoned judgments (e.g.,
determining the probability of potential outcomes where some amount of risk is involved; Kahneman,
2003). Theoretically, this is because the rational cold system monitors the intuitive hot system. Any
doubt or uncertainty one experiences over a situation is the result of the cold system, as this logic‐based
cold system monitors inconsistencies or conflicts that arise from thoughts about a particular situation.
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For example, the hot system may immediately deem the construction worker situation as immoral be‐
cause killing anyone, regardless of the reason, is wrong (the deontologic choice). The cold system, on
the other hand, may acknowledge the intuitive/reflexive reaction of the hot system, but also be able to
simultaneously conceive that the death of one person is more palatable than the deaths of many other
people (including oneself). In this case, the cold system, in contrast to the hot system, may arguably
determine that it is more appropriate to repeatedly kick one’s co‐worker from the scaffolding if it saves
the lives of many other people (the utilitarian choice).
The extent to which one relies more heavily on a controlled or automatic processing system is a
function of cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 1998). If sufficient cognitive resources required to make
a controlled, resource‐dependant decision, indicative of the cold system, are unavailable then one will
rely on the resource efficient hot system. Accessibility naturally decreases as interference from compet‐
ing information sources or demands on attention increase, and there are differences in one’s vulnerabil‐
ity to interference. Both vulnerability to interference and system availability are related to cognitive
deficits based on internal factors, such as differences in age, arousal, and depression (Hasher & Zacks,
1988). System availability can also be affected by external factors otherwise referred to as “loads” such
as time pressure, concurrent cognitive tasks, mood fluctuations, and time of day. These loads effectively
reduce access to available cognitive processing resources. Availability determined by internal factors
tends to be a greater predictor of task performance (e.g., decision‐making) than availability determined
by external factors (Kahneman, 2003).
Natural sources of cognitive ability, or Working Memory Capacity (WMC), are described as an in‐
teractive cognitive processing system where the interpretation and temporary storage of language, im‐
agery, and episodic memories is required for various tasks (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). WMC can be measured using dual‐processing tasks, and such measures correlate highly with flu‐
id intelligence (Unsworth & Engle, 2007), language processing (Baddeley, 2003) and decision‐making
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ability (Hinson, Jameson, & Witney, 2003). The central executive component to working memory is a
combination of storage and controlled attention (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999), and is
needed when two goals are actively being maintained (Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Differences in WMC
are not universally apparent across tasks, but have been shown to reveal themselves 1) when conscious
effort is required to override a naturally intuitive response, and 2) when simultaneously maintaining and
retrieving task‐relevant information. This, in essence, is The Working Memory Problem (Unsworth &
Engle, 2007).
Persons with lower WMC have low cognitive processing ability, relative to high WMC persons
and thus generally make more judgment errors (MacDonald, Just, & Carpenter, 1992), are more suscept‐
ible to stereotype use (Schmader & Johns, 2003), and likely rely on the hot processing system during
these tasks as it provides the quickest route to a decision. Persons with higher WMC have a cognitive
advantage compared to their low capacity counterparts and have more control over when and how their
cold system is utilized. Working Memory is positively associated with deductive reasoning (Bara, Buccia‐
relli, & Johnson‐Laird, 1995), as well as making consistant judgements across a variety of challenging
tasks. Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008) found that high WMC participants consistently found is morally
appropriate to sacrifice one person to save several others regardless of the situation or the associated
emotionality. Both the rationalist and the social intuitionist models of moral judgment include an emo‐
tional or affective component. Emotional responsiveness tends to surface with little or no intention on
the part of the person experiencing the emotion, thereby making this a largely intuitive and automatic
reaction, and these emotional reactions are strongly predicted by WMC. A recent study by Schmeichel,
Volokhov, and Demaree (2008) found that persons with low (relative to high) WMC were less able to
regulate their emotional experiences even when instructed to do so. Further, Kleider, Parrott, and King
(2009) found that participants with lower WMC made more shoot/don’t shoot errors when emotionally
and physiologically aroused rather than when they were in a non‐aroused state suggesting that for low
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WMC persons, emotionality usurps cognitive resources required to make controlled decisions . Thus, if
low WMC persons are more influenced by emotional reactions, and less ability to control the automatic‐
ity of these reactions, then High WMC persons, then emotions likely influence judgments during moral
deliberation. Conversely, if high WMC persons have more capacity for controlled processing than low
WMC persons, then even though they may experience the same emotional reaction as low WMC per‐
sons, intentional processing likely overrides these reactions leading to a logic‐based rather than emo‐
tion‐based decision. This is what Moore and colleagues (2008) argued when they asked persons of vary‐
ing WMCs to make moral assessments. The authors found that, compared to low WMC participants,
high WMC persons judged situations where the deaths described where both personal (i.e., harm/death
caused to a person) and inevitable (i.e., death occurring regardless of participant’s decision). In other
words, low WMC persons were less likely to justify killing a person even if the death would occur regard‐
less of their decision. This suggests that they used their automatic emotional responses (regarding the
personal nature of the deaths) to guide their judgments. High WMC persons not only found these situa‐
tions to be more appropriate relative to low WMC persons, but were consistent in the magnitude of
their appropriateness ratings across similar categories of decisions (e.g., personal‐inevitable). This sug‐
gests that high WMC persons used a controlled strategy with which to make their judgments rather than
relying on an emotional reaction to inform their moral valuations. Moral or other types of decisions can
be biased based on the inappropriate application of available heuristics (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994;
Kahneman, et al., 1999). These heuristics or “rules of thumb” are cognitive short‐cuts for previously ex‐
perienced events or for information previously encountered. Using these short‐cuts for mental efficien‐
cy is economical and allows for the re‐appropriation of cognitions for other necessary tasks (Goldstein,
2005). Heuristic processing is used when hot cognitions are activated (Ask & Granhag, 2007). An exam‐
ple of a moral heuristic might be, ”punish and do not reward betrayals of trust,” (Lapsley & Hill, 2008).
Beyond rule misapplication, other sources of bias or error in judgment can occur from lack of attention
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and/or distraction (Stanovich & West, 2000). If someone makes an error, then first we must identify
what the error is a lapse from. Clearly, there are no strict criteria that identify an erroneous decision
because a mistake in judgment for one person may be a logical conclusion for another (Johnson‐Laird,
1983). However, if moral judgment is a dual‐process phenomenon, and internal factors predict the su‐
periority of cognitive systems crucial in this decision process, then is it possible to activate the less do‐
minant system? The motivation to attend to something beyond a natural emotional response or salient
stimuli‐specific features requires deliberate instruction. Getting people to think statistically (versus emo‐
tionally) and then apply statistical strategy to decision‐making can occur as education level increases,
and if training in statistical reasoning is acquired. (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Fong, Krantz,
& Nisbett, 1986; Kahneman, 2003).
If we can identify the likely default location of one’s attention and strategy during decision‐
making, then it may be possible to shift one’s attention to an alternative source so an alternative deci‐
sion can be made. By examining the roles of the hot and cold cognitive systems in moral situations, as
well as the individual differences therein, we can identify the cognitive underpinnings behind these
judgments. In the current paper I will first address whether moral judgments differ from nonmoral
judgments, and whether moral judgments are especially susceptible to variations in cognitive processing
strategies (i.e., hot/cold systems) because of the emotional weight of the dilemmas. Second, I will also
determine whether focusing on one’s emotions will, activate the emotion‐based processing system the‐
reby making any judgment feel like a moral one, thus facilitating and emotion‐based judgment. Dual‐
process reasoning may function differently when determining the appropriateness of moral versus
nonmoral behavior. Conversely, all decisions may be swayed by activating emotional versus factual con‐
tent suggesting that people have control over which cognitive system is engaged when making a deci‐
sion.
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1.1

Overview
If moral situations inevitably evoke an intuitive emotional response, then how are these deci‐

sions made with rational thought? I hypothesize that cold cognitive processing introduces doubt onto
the emotion‐based response of the hot cognitive system. Moore and colleagues (2008) showed that
WMC impacted moral judgments, and that low WMC persons used their emotions during decision‐
making whereas high WMC persons reasoned thoughtfully during the judgment process. Considering
the construction worker example one more time ‐ If one chooses to kick the single co‐worker off the
building, then this is seen as the cold system rising above the emotional reaction of hot system (which
may be otherwise incapacitating). If one does not choose to kick the single co‐worker off the building,
then is this an example of an inferior cold cognitive system? I hypothesize that we are more likely to see
the former decision in persons with high WMC and the latter in person with low WMC. If this pattern is
evident, then are we able to access (or activate) cold cognitive processing in the low WMC persons by
giving them deliberate instruction to focus on the information necessary to make a logical decision? Are
we also able to deactivate cold processing in high WMC persons by instructing them to focus only on
affective information, thereby facilitating an emotion‐based judgment consistent with hot cognitive
processing?
In this study I had two questions of interest. First, I tested whether the cognitive mechanism
underlying judgments to traditional moral situations is universal to situations that are morally neutral. If
moral judgments evoke an emotional response (i.e., activating the hot system), then I expect low WMC
persons to vary their judgments of moral acceptability between situations that are moral versus non‐
moral. Alternatively, high WMC persons, who rely on the cold system, should rate judgments equally
acceptable across situations. Next, I wondered whether it was possible to modify the impact of hot ver‐
sus cold processing systems on judgment deliberation. Here, I measured WMC, and then presented par‐
ticipants with a series of dilemmas (moral and nonmoral). I instructed participants to focus on the emo‐
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tional information in some scenarios, and the factual information in others. Participants determined the
degree to which they found each scenario morally wrong.
1.2

Hypotheses & Predictions
I hypothesize that moral judgment is unique based on the emotional undercurrent present in

each moral situation. I hypothesize that the emotionality imbedded in the moral dilemmas will be the
salient motivation for low WMC persons when determining moral valuation and I predict that they will
rate moral dilemmas significantly more morally wrong when compared to ratings of nonmoral dilem‐
mas. Further, I hypothesize that the cognitive ability of the high WMC persons will diffuse the emotional
heatedness among the moral dilemmas leaving these persons with cold and rational deliberations. I
predict then that moral and nonmoral ratings among the high WMC persons will not differ.
Second, because previous research suggests that cognitive ability predicts how one approaches
moral judgment I hypothesize that it is possible to shift these judgments based on deliberate instruction.
Overall, I predict that persons with high WMC will find the moral situations to be less abhorrent than
low WMC persons. Due to their cognitive strength and control, these participants will be able to direct
their attention to emotional information when instructed, but this control will render their judgments of
moral wrongness equivalent across instruction blocks. For low WMC persons, their lack of cognitive
control will render then unable to shift their attention far enough away from their emotion‐motivating
intuitions and onto the content‐based information when instructed to do so. Therefore, this lack of
cognitive control will leave them susceptible to the effect of the instructional variations, resulting in
moral judgment ratings that are significantly greater when told to focus on emotions, and significantly
less wrong when told to focus on facts. I do not expect there to be any variations in judgments to non‐
moral dilemmas as a function of instruction block and WMC.
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2
2.1

METHOD
Participants
Participants included 174 Georgia State University undergraduate students recruited using the

online participant pool, and were awarded course credit for completing the study. Five participants
were removed from the dataset prior to analysis; three were removed for failing to complete one or all
of the experiment tasks and two were removed for cheating on the OPSPAN task (i.e., writing down let‐
ters that needed to be remembered). A total of 169 students were included in the current analyses.
The demographic distribution is as follows: 122 students self‐reported as female, 47 self‐reported as
male; 78 identified African American, 39 White, 30 Asian, 11 Bi‐racial, 5 Latino/a, and 6 reported they
were of another race not listed on the demographic form. The majority of participants (79%) ranged in
age from 18 to 21 years.
2.2

Procedure
When participants arrived for their designated session they were greeted by the experimenter

and escorted back to the lab. Each participant was individually assigned to a personal computer sepa‐
rated from the other computers with a three‐sided partition (designed to discourage distraction and
maintain privacy). After reading and signing the informed consent document, participants provided de‐
mographic information, and then completed the OPSPAN task (see Materials). Finally, participants were
presented with dilemma vignettes in three blocks. Each block contained four moral dilemmas and four
nonmoral dilemmas. The first block was always the control condition whereby participants were not
told to focus on any particular piece of information, but to simply read the information presented and
consider the moral implications of their decision. Following each dilemma participants were asked to
determine how morally wrong it would be to carry out the action suggested from the vignette.
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The second and third blocks of dilemmas were the experimental instruction‐focus blocks. Here
participants were told to focus “only on the facts in each dilemma” (fact‐focus block) or to focus “on
how you would feel if you were truly faced with this situation” (emotion‐focus block). Eight dilemmas
were presented in each block, and the instruction‐focus blocks were counterbalanced (i.e., half of the
participants were randomly assigned to complete the fact‐focus block followed by the emotion‐focus
block, and the other half completed the emotion‐focus block first). Just as in the control‐focus block,
participants had to determine how morally wrong each suggested dilemma action would be. All dilem‐
mas within each block were randomly presented. Once participants completed all three blocks they
were debriefed and awarded course credit for their participation.
2.3

Materials
Operation Span Task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005): The automated version of the

Operation Span (OPSPAN) is a dual‐processing task, wherein equation‐letter combinations are shown to
participants throughout each task trial. Here, participants are shown an equation (e.g., “9/3 + 5 = 8”)
and prompted to provide a true‐false response. Once a response is given a single letter is then displayed
on the computer screen for 800 ms. Participants are required to remember the letter presented after
each equation, and then periodically prompted to recall these letters in the order they were shown.
Letter‐string recall varies randomly between 2 and 7 letters. On‐screen feedback provides the total
number of correctly recalled letters for each letter‐string set. The alternating presentation of a mathe‐
matical equation and letter continues for 75 trials and varies in difficulty. The total OPSPAN score is cal‐
culated as the number of correctly recalled letter sequences across all trials. Higher scores reflect higher
WMC. Measures of internal consistency, such as coefficient alphas and split‐half correlations range
from .7 ‐ .9, and test‐retest reliability has been shown across time with correlations between .7 and .8
reflecting this stability (Conway et al., 2005).
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Dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001; Bohm & Pfister, 2005): Moral di‐
lemmas (n=24) were adopted and modified from previous studies. Twelve dilemmas described a situa‐
tion where the life of at least one person was in jeopardy, requiring the participant to decide how moral‐
ly wrong it would be to kill one innocent person to save the lives of multiple other people. An example
would include the classic Footbridge Problem where a trolley traveling down a stretch of tracks has lost
its ability to brake and will hit five men working on the tracks if it is not stopped. The participant must
decide how morally wrong it would be to shove one person onto the tracks in order to stop the trolley,
ultimately killing that one person but saving the lives of the other five track workers. The remaining
twelve dilemmas contained an environmental dilemma where either the environment or humans would
benefit from the outcome, but not both. An example would include the classic Tragedy of the Commons
where a rancher shares a common area of grazing land with nine other ranchers. There is an unwritten
commitment among the ranchers not to overuse the common grazing land. The rancher comes across a
special deal where he can purchase a number of additional cattle for a very low price. This would bene‐
fit him personally, but fall in direct opposition to the land agreement. The participant must decide how
morally wrong it would be for the rancher to purchase the extra cattle. Moral wrongness was measured
on a 1‐6 Likert scale (1 = not morally wrong – 6 = very morally wrong).

3
3.1

RESULTS
Data Preparation
OPSPAN Scores: The distribution of OPSPAN scores was checked for normality both visually and

statistically. The histogram appeared to represent a normal distribution of scores. Skewness and kurto‐
sis values were acquired and then divided by their respective standard errors. Significant amounts of
neither skewness nor kurtosis were observed within this distribution. Outliers were not observed here
either. A tertiary split was next conducted across OPSPAN scores in order to separate participants into
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one of three WMC categories; low (n=60), medium (n=51), high (n=58). Only participants that fell into
the low and high WMC categories were used in the analyses that follow.
Moral Judgments: Average ratings of moral wrongness were calculated for each of the 24 di‐
lemmas presented to participants. Dilemmas with an average rating ranging between 1 and 3 were
coded ‘nonmoral’, and the dilemmas with an average rating between 4 and 6 were coded ‘moral’. This
coding scheme resulted in three moral and five nonmoral dilemmas within the control block; and four
moral and four nonmoral dilemmas across both emotion and fact blocks. Next, eight values of “moral
wrongness” were calculated for each participant. First, the average rating of “moral wrongness” for
each dilemma type (moral, nonmoral) was calculated (n=2), followed by the average rating for each di‐
lemma type within each block (control, emotion, fact; n=6).
3.2

Main Analyses
I first asked whether people would use the same criteria (i.e., cognitive mechanism) when mak‐

ing both moral and nonmoral decisions, and whether differences in cognitive functioning would matter
across these types of dilemmas. To test this, I ran a 2 (WMC: low, high) x 2 (Dilemma: moral, nonmoral)
mixed‐model ANOVA on average ratings of moral wrongness for each dilemma type. The valuation of
moral versus nonmoral dilemmas did not differ based on One’s cognitive ability (low vs high WMC);
however, there was a main effect of dilemma, such that moral dilemmas (M=4.59) were rated signifi‐
cantly more wrong than nonmoral dilemmas (M=3.12), F(1,116)=268.96, ηp2= .70, p<.01. With these
data, and counter to the conclusions drawn by Moore and colleagues (2008), I conclude that WMC alone
does not provide information regarding moral judgment motivation. Instead, judgment variations
across WMC groups may only be evident when directly accessing the hypothesized judgment strategy
(i.e., emotions for low WM persons and facts for high WM persons).
Second, I asked whether it was possible to shift judgments based on deliberate instructions (to
focus on factual or emotional content). I ran a 2 (WMC: low, high) x 2 (Dilemma: moral, nonmoral) x 3
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(Instruction: control, emotion, fact) mixed‐model ANOVA on average ratings of moral wrongness for
each dilemma type across each instruction block. Significant main effects of Dilemma Type and Instruc‐
tion were observed, as was a two‐way interaction between Dilemma Type and Instruction. A three‐way
interaction was also evident, F(2,232)=3.53, ηp2= .03, p=.03. See Table 1 for interaction means and stan‐
dard deviations.

Table 1 ‐ Means and standard deviations for the three‐way interaction between WMC, Dilemma, and Instruction

WMC Group
Low WMC
High WMC

Dilemma Type
Moral
Nonmoral
Moral
Nonmoral

Control
4.48(1.12)
3.68(1.02)
4.45(1.38)
3.48(1.00)

Instruction - M(SD)
Emotion
4.94(1.08)
2.75(1.13)
4.19(1.47)
2.62(1.01)

Fact
4.84(1.20)
3.14(1.20)
4.64(1.35)
3.05(1.11)

The Effect of Low WMC: The interaction was first decomposed to look at the effect of WMC
(low, high) on moral judgments. A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA, of Dilemma Type x Instruction, was
conducted for each WMC group independently. For the low WMC group, a main effect of Dilemma Type
emerged along with a significant Dilemma Type by Instruction interaction, F(2,118)=27.31, ηp2= .32,
p<.01, see Figure 1. The interaction was explored by conducting two one‐way repeated measures ANO‐
VAs to test the effect of instruction on each dilemma type individually. First, there was a significant
main effect of Instruction on ratings of moral wrongness for moral dilemmas, F(2,118)=5.87, ηp2= .09,
p<.01. Across pairwise comparisons, judgments in the control (no instruction focus) block were signifi‐
cantly lower than judgments in the emotion‐focus block (p<.01), as well as judgments in the fact‐focus
block (p=.01). Judgments across the emotion‐focus and fact‐focus blocks were not significantly different
from one another (p=.47). Second, the effect of Instruction was also significant for the nonmoral di‐
lemmas, F(2,118)=19.31, ηp2= .25, p<.01. Ratings of moral wrongness in the control (no instruction)
block were greatest and significantly different from ratings in the emotion block (p<.01), as well as the
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fact block (p=.01). Ratings in the emotion and fact blocks were also significantly different from one
another (p=.01).

Figure 1 ‐ Avg. rating of moral wrongness (by Dilemma Type and Instruction) for Low WMC persons

Next, the effect of Dilemma was tested on each of the instruction blocks by conducting three
one‐way repeated measures ANOVAs. The effect of Dilemma type within the control block was signifi‐
cant, F(1,59)=31.14, ηp2= .35, p<.01. Moral dilemmas received significantly higher ratings of moral
wrongness than nonmoral dilemmas. The effect of dilemma was also significant within the emotion
block, F(1,59)=172.49, ηp2= .75, p<.01. Moral dilemmas were rated as significantly more morally wrong
than nonmoral dilemmas. Finally, the effect of dilemma within the fact block was tested, and found to
be significant, F(1,59)=109.01, ηp2= .65, p<.01. Again, moral dilemmas were rated as significantly more
morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas.
These data do not support my prediction. I expected to find significant differences in judgments
to moral dilemmas across the emotion and fact blocks, such that ratings in the emotion block were sig‐
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nificantly greater than ratings in the fact block. Instead, moral dilemmas in the emotion and fact blocks
are being rated significantly more morally wrong than when no instruction focus is given, and are not
significantly different from one another. The instruction focus manipulation (regardless of the type)
may be leading to a general salience of dilemma information, thus prohibiting low WMC persons from
differentiating between emotion‐based content from fact‐based content. When trying to focus one’s
attention on specific pieces of information, all content evokes a visceral reaction, leading to increased
valuations.
The Effect of High WMC: A two‐way ANOVA, of Dilemma x Instruction, was conducted for the
high WMC group next. Main effects of Dilemma and Instruction emerged along with a significant inte‐
raction, F(2,114)=4.82, ηp2= .08, p=.01, see Figure 2. The interaction was explored by conducting two
one‐way repeated measures ANOVAs to test the effect of instruction on each dilemma type individually.
There was a significant main effect of Instruction on ratings of moral wrongness for moral dilemmas,
F(2,114)=3.39, ηp2= .06, p=.04. Judgments in the emotion block were rated as significantly less morally
wrong then judgments in the fact block (p<.01), but not significantly different than the control block
(p=.16). Judgments made in the control block were not significantly different from judgments in the fact
block (p=.32). The effect of Instruction was significant for the nonmoral dilemmas as well,
F(2,114)=15.37, ηp2= .21, p<.01. Ratings of moral wrongness in the emotion block were lowest and sig‐
nificantly different from ratings in the control (p<.01), and fact blocks (p<.01). Ratings in the control and
fact blocks were also significantly different from one another (p=.01).
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Figure 2 ‐ Avg. rating of moral wrongness (by Dilemma Type and Instruction) for High WMC persons

Next, the effect of Dilemma was tested on each of the instruction blocks, by conducting three
one‐way repeated measures ANOVAs. First, the effect of Dilemma type within the control block was
significant, F(1,57)=25.03, ηp2= .31, p<.01. Moral dilemmas received significantly higher ratings of moral
wrongness than nonmoral dilemmas. The effect of dilemma was also significant within the emotion
block, F(1,57)=64.58, ηp2= .53, p<.01. Moral dilemmas were rated as significantly more morally wrong
than nonmoral dilemmas. Finally, the effect of dilemma within the fact block was tested, and found to
be significant, F(1,57)=73.00, ηp2= .56, p<.01. Again, moral dilemmas were rated as significantly more
morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas.
These data are also inconsistent with my predictions. I expected high WMC persons to maintain
such cognitive stability that no judgment differences would emerge regardless of the instruction focus
manipulation. Instead, I found that ratings of moral wrongness significantly decreased when told to fo‐
cus on emotions relative to when focusing on the fact‐based content information. The emotion‐focus
instruction may have led to such a breech in judgment strategy that high WMC persons were left with
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nothing to support ratings equivalent to when focusing on fact‐based information (a cognitive strategy
consistent with their natural response). Their tendency toward cold cognitive processes renders the
emotion‐focus instruction insufficient to prompt strong moral valuation.
The Effect of Moral Dilemmas: The interaction was next decomposed to look at the effect of di‐
lemma type (moral, nonmoral) on moral judgments. A two‐way mixed model ANOVA, of WMC x In‐
struction, was conducted for each dilemma type independently. For moral dilemmas, a significant main
effect of Instruction emerged along with a significant interaction, F(2,232)=5.64, ηp2= .05, p<.01, see Fig‐
ure 3. Given that the previous analyses already explored the effect of instruction on each WMC group,
the current interaction was decomposed by testing the effect of WMC on each instruction type. An in‐
dependent samples t‐test was first conducted for low versus high WMC groups providing judgments in
the control block. The effect of WMC was not significant (p=.88). A second independent samples t‐test
was analyzed, testing the effect of WMC on ratings within the emotion block. The effect was significant,
t(116)=3.16, p<.01. When focusing on emotions, low WMC persons found moral dilemmas significantly
more morally wrong than high WMC persons. A final independent samples t‐test was conducted on rat‐
ings within the fact block. The effect of WMC was not significant (p=.39). When evaluating moral di‐
lemmas, differences across judgments only emerge as a function of cognitive ability when told to focus
on one’s emotional response.
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Figure 3 ‐ Avg. rating of moral wrongness (by WMC and Instruction) for Moral Dilemmas

The Effect of Nonmoral Dilemmas: I next looked at the effect of nonmoral dilemmas on moral
judgments. A two‐way mixed model ANOVA, of WMC x Instruction, was conducted, and a significant
main effect of Instruction emerged, F(2,232)=34.43, ηp2= .23, p<.01. Regardless of WMC group, all par‐
ticipants rated dilemmas in the control block (M=3.59) as most morally wrong. Judgments significantly
decreased in strength in the fact block (M=3.10, p<.01), as well as in the emotion block (M=2.68, p<.01).
Judgments in the fact and emotion blocks were significantly different from one another (p<.01). When
considering situations with an absence of emotional content differences in WMC do not emerge.
The Effect of Instruction ‐ Control: Finally, the effects of WMC group and Dilemma Type were
tested on each level of Instruction individually. A 2x2 mixed‐model ANOVA was first conducted on rat‐
ings of moral wrongness to dilemmas presented in the control block. A significant main effect of Di‐
lemma Type was observed, F(1,116)=54.41, ηp2= .32, p<.01. All participants rated moral dilemmas
(M=4.47) in the control block significantly more morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas (M=3.58).
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The Effect of Instruction ‐ Emotion‐focus: The same analysis was conducted on dilemmas pre‐
sented in the emotion block. Main effects of WMC group and Dilemma Type were observed along with a
significant interaction, F(1,116)=5.64, ηp2= .05, p=.02, see Figure 4. This interaction was decomposed by
first examining the effect of dilemma type on each WMC group individually. A paired samples t‐test
comparison was run for the low WMC persons first, and emerged as significant, t(59)=13.13, p<.01.
When focusing on emotions, low WMC participants rated moral dilemmas significantly more morally
wrong than nonmoral dilemmas. The same t‐test comparison was conducted on the ratings of high
WMC persons, and also found to be significant, t(57)=8.04, p<.01. High WMC persons also found moral
dilemmas significantly more morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas. Independent t‐tests were finally
conducted comparing each WMC group across each dilemma type. Low WMC persons found moral di‐
lemmas significantly more morally wrong than high WMC persons, t(116)=3.16, p<.01. There was no
difference in moral valuations between WMC groups for the nonmoral dilemmas (p=.50).

Figure 4 ‐ Avg. rating of moral wrongness (by WMC and Dilemma Type) for judgments in the Emotion‐focus block
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The Effect of Instruction ‐ Fact‐focus: Finally, a 2x2 mixed‐model ANOVA was conducted on rat‐
ings of moral wrongness to dilemmas presented in the fact block. A significant main effect of Dilemma
Type was observed, F(1,116)=177.85, ηp2= .61, p<.01. All participants rated moral dilemmas (M=4.74)
significantly more morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas (M=3.10).

4

DISCUSSION
This study addressed two questions of interest. First, I tested whether the cognitive mechanism

underlying judgments to traditionlly moral situations was universal to situations that were morally neu‐
tral. I hypothesized that moral and nonmoral judgments would be subjected to different processing
strategies because of the emotion uniquely tied to morality, and thus predicted that low WMC persons
(who are presumed to be particularly susceptible to emotional information) would rate moral dilemmas
significantly more morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas. I further predicted that high WMC persons
would be able to suppress the emotional undercurrent of the moral dilemmas and rate both moral and
nonmoral dilemmas equally morally wrong. I did not find support for my hypothesis. All participants
(regardless of WMC) found moral dilemmas more morally wrong than nonmoral dilemmas. Cognitive
ability did not predict moral valuation, a finding that is in contrast to the data evidenced by Moore,
Clark, and Kane (2008). These authors found significant differences in moral judgments when high com‐
pared to low WMC persons viewed personal‐inevitable dilemmas. Although the current study also used
these dilemmas, our participants also randomly viewed categorically nonmoral dilemmas. The partici‐
pants in the Moore and colleagues’ study did not view nonmoral dilemmas, but instead read moral di‐
lemmas that systematically varied by content information (e.g., type of death, beneficiary of death).
The difference in relative comparison between dilemmas may be one source for the disparate findings
within the current study and previous research.
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Second, I tested whether it was possible to modify the impact of hot versus cold processing sys‐
tems on moral judgment deliberation. High WMC participants, who make logic‐based decisions, should
have been able to shift attention from the factual/content‐based information to emotional information
when instructed, as they have the capacity to simultaneously process more information than low WMC
persons. However, this focus on emotional content should not affect their ratings of moral wrongness.
For low WMC persons, shifting attention from emotion‐based to fact‐based content should have been
difficult compared to high WMC persons as they have comparatively fewer resources to process content
information. Their comparative lack of cognitive control should have left them susceptible to the effect
of the instructional variations, resulting in moral judgment ratings that were significantly greater when
told to focus on emotions, and significantly less wrong when told to focus on facts. I did not expect
there to be any variations in judgments to nonmoral dilemmas as a function of instruction focus or
WMC. In general, the instruction manipulation was successful and judgments varied across presenta‐
tion blocks in both predictable and unpredictable ways. Judgments to nonmoral dilemmas were not
impacted by cognitive ability as expected, but varied unexpectedly by instruction. For both high and low
WMC persons, ratings of moral wrongness to nonmoral dilemmas were greatest when no instruction
focus was given (control block). Ratings of moral wrongness decreased when told to focus on emotions,
and increased when instructed to focus on fact‐based information. This pattern was observed regard‐
less of WMC. It is difficult to conclude more from this finding than the instruction was an effective
means of shifting focus on dilemma content, but does not lend itself to deeper interpretation at this
time.
Judgment to moral dilemmas also shifted based on the instruction manipulation, but in alter‐
nate patterns contingent upon cognitive ability. Counter to my prediction, judgments shifted for high
WMC persons, such that moral valuations in the fact‐focus block were greater than in the emotion‐focus
block. This effect arguably emerged because the cold cognitive preference of the high WMC persons
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resulted in an inability to justify an equivalent rating of moral wrongness in the emotion block because
the judgment criteria violated their logical processing strategy. Ratings dropped significantly when
compared to decisions rendered when focusing on fact‐based information (an instruction consistent
with pre‐established deliberation preference). Decisions shifted for low WMC persons as predicted, but
in unexpected directions. When told to focus on anything specific (facts or emotions), ratings of moral
wrongness increased relative to when no instruction focus was given (control block). I suggest this oc‐
curred because the attention‐focus instruction led to a general information‐salience‐effect, such that
any content was accompanied by a physiological cue which resulted in increased ratings of moral
wrongness. Further, when observing the judgments between WMC groups, the only comparable differ‐
ence occurred for moral dilemmas in the emotion‐focus block. Thus, the one element incorporated into
both Rationalist and Social Intuitionist models of moral judgment (i.e., hot cognition) is the only place
where cognitive functioning impacted decision‐making outcomes.
Prinz (2006) argued that the experience of emotion alone is both necessary and sufficient for
moral valuation to occur. If this were accurate, then I would have found all participants (regardless of
cognitive ability) rating judgments in the emotion‐focus block more morally wrong than either of the
other two blocks, but this pattern did not occur. Thus, emotion lends motivational support for moral
valuations, but is not sufficient in‐and‐of itself to turn an otherwise nonmoral situation into a moral one;
not even for persons whose primary source of motivation is their emotional reactions (i.e., low WMC
persons). Lapsley and Hill (2008) argued that it is not the hot cognitive processing system at large which
carries a role in the moral judgment process, but rather that its role is instead a function of the specific
mechanism within the hot system that contributes to these decisions. This mechanism may be social
intuitions, moral heuristics, or accessibility to cognitive resources. In the current study, I tested the role
of reasoning capacity indexed by WMC) and found that judgments were not based on reflexive respond‐
ing alone. If they were, then persons with low WMC (whose emotional intuitions are more readily ac‐
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cessible) would have found both moral and nonmoral dilemmas more morally egregious than persons
with high WMC, but this is not the pattern that emerged.
If moral judgments rely in part on the accessibility of cognitive resources, then moral delibera‐
tion should be impacted by reducing available resources. Resource reduction can be accomplished by
introducing external sources of interference (“loads”) such as time pressure, or concurrent cognitive
tasks. These loads reduce access to available cognitive resources. Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Ny‐
strom, and Cohen (2008) found that cognitive load slowed reaction time during moral deliberation, and
concluded that these loads decrease controlled judgments. It follows that external load, as well as in‐
ternal WMC would interact to predict moral judgments. Thus, low WMC persons should be more sus‐
ceptible to load than high WMC persons. I am currently collecting data where a cognitive load is in‐
duced during the judgment process, and occurs for half of the dilemmas presented in each block. Test‐
ing the role of heuristics would be a more challenging task to take on, as social intuitions and moral heu‐
ristics are, 1) highly correlated, and 2) below conscious awareness (Sunstein, 2005). The “rule” or deli‐
berate instruction we gave participants across experimental blocks can certainly be viewed as decision‐
making strategies, but do not fit the heuristic criteria outlined by Lapsley and Hill (2008). Determining
whether heuristics or intuitions are the prominent hot cognitive tool used across these judgments is
moot as the primary goal of this study was not to tease apart these options. Instead it was to localize
the application of hot versus cold processing systems for persons with varied cognitive processing ten‐
dencies. The emotion‐ versus fact‐focus rules were intended to shift one’s attention toward the in‐
structed information thereby altering decisions, and was successful at differentially affecting judgments;
however, effectiveness of the strategy was contingent upon one’s cognitive ability.
In summary, I conclude that moral judgment is not simply the product of cognitive ability and is
not sufficiently motivated by an emotional experience. Accessibility to cognitive resources and/or men‐
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tal rules (or short‐cuts) seem the likeliest possibility for understanding the role of hot cognitive
processing during moral deliberation.
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Appendix A
Moral Dilemmas
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Control Block

SPACE STATION
You are an engineer on the international space station, in orbit around the Earth. Suddenly, a fire breaks
out in the cargo bay. The automatic fire safety system will open the outer door of the cargo bay, letting
the oxygen out of the bay and thus putting out the fire. The automatic system only works when the in‐
ner portal to the rest of the station has been sealed. One member of the crew, a mechanic in the cargo
bay, has put on half of his bulky space suit when the fire begins. He runs to the portal to climb through
to safety, but the portal is too narrow to fit through while wearing a space suit. You realize that if he
tries to climb through, he will get stuck and the fire will spread through the rest of the station because
the safety system will not operate with the portal open. There is no time for him to take off the suit be‐
fore the fire spreads. The only way you can prevent the spread of the fire, and save your life and the
rest of the crew, is to push the mechanic back through the portal and into the cargo bay. This way, the
safety system will seal the door and decompress the cargo bay, but it will also suck the mechanic into
space and kill him. How morally wrong would it be for you to push the mechanic back through the por‐
tal, and into space, in order to save yourself and the rest of the crew?

HIV
You are a doctor. One of your patients, whom you have diagnosed as HIV positive, is about to receive a
blood transfusion prior to being released from the hospital. While this will prolong his life, he will even‐
tually die from the disease. He has told you, in the confidence of your doctor‐patient relationship, that
after he gets his transfusion, and his medicine from you, he intends to infect as many people as possible
with HIV starting that evening. Because you are bound by doctor‐patient confidentiality, there is no legal
way to stop this man from carrying out his plan. Even if you warned the police, they would not be able
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to arrest him, since his medical information is protected. It occurs to you that you could contaminate his
medication by putting an untraceable poison in it that will kill him before he gets a chance to infect oth‐
ers. How morally wrong would it be for you to poison this man in order to prevent him from spreading
HIV?

SHARK
You are part of a U.N. humanitarian team of SCUBA divers who are deactivating old World War II un‐
derwater anti‐ship mines. One member of your diving team injures himself while trying to deactivate a
mine. The blood in the water has attracted several sharks in the area. A feeding frenzy is about to ensue,
with the sharks eating everything and everyone in sight. You have a spear‐gun, but only one spear and
there are many sharks. The bleeding diver is swimming toward the last protective shark cage and will
reach it before you and the others. He will die from his injuries but will be saved from the sharks if he
reaches the cage. The sharks, following the blood, are coming too close for you and the other divers to
escape. You realize that if you shoot and kill the injured diver with your spear‐gun before he reaches
the cage, the sharks would stop to eat him while you and the others escaped to safety. How morally
wrong would it be for you to kill this diver in order to save yourself and the rest of the group?

Fact Block

ROWBOAT
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You are in a rowboat with a tour guide while sight‐seeing on a lake in Alaska. You notice that three child‐
ren have overturned their boat nearby. They are now in danger of quickly freezing to death in the icy
water. You begin to row over to rescue them when you realize that your boat will not hold you, the tour
guide, and the three children. Two of the children are closer to your boat than the third child. As you
and the tour guide pull in the first two it is obvious that one of them is too heavy and if you keep him on
board your boat will sink and all of the children will die. Neither you nor the guide can get out because
you are rowing and the guide is performing CPR. The only way to save two children is to throw the large
child off the boat and rescue the third one. How morally wrong would it be fore you to throw one child
off the boat to die in order to save the other two?

FUMES
You are an orderly in a hospital during the night shift. You notice that a chemical has just been spilled in
a room containing six patients. This chemical is highly toxic and if left on the floor will rapidly evaporate
creating a poisonous gas. This will inevitably kill all the patients in the room. This chemical cannot simply
be mopped up, nor can it be soaked up with towels or sheets. However, because you have worked
around this chemical before, you know that this chemical absorbs into human skin very rapidly. You
could pull one of the patients out of bed onto the spill so that the chemical will completely soak into this
person’s skin instead of evaporating into the air in the room. This will quickly kill the one patient but
save the other five patients from the gas. How morally wrong would it be for you to put this person
onto the spilled chemical in order to save the other five patients?

TYCOON
You are an electrician who has been hired to fix an electrical problem in the home of a very wealthy
steel tycoon who is terminally ill with a very slow‐growing cancer. Recently it had been publicly an‐
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nounced that when this man eventually dies, his enormous personal fortune is to be given to the local
children’s hospital. You know that there are many children at this hospital who could be saved with this
money, but who cannot wait much longer before they die. It occurs to you that while you’re in the
house, fixing the electrical problem, you could quietly slip into the tycoon’s room while he is sleeping
and suffocate him by covering his nose and mouth with your gloved hands. This would look exactly like
he had died from a heart attack. Then his money would go to the children’s hospital where it would
save many lives. How morally wrong would it be for you to kill this man so that the children’s hospital
will get the money that it needs?

GATHERING FIREWOOD
The mountain forests are rapidly disappearing in a rural area because so much wood is needed by the
village for cooking and heating. On the deforested slopes, the heavy rains wash away the soil, which
young seedlings need to grow into mature trees. The government has established a preserve, or pro‐
tected area, to help replenish the forest, which cannot currently support a diverse and healthy animal
population. Past the forest preserve there is a designated firewood gathering area. The local residents,
including you, have the daily job of walking up the steep mountain slopes toward the designated area to
cut firewood for use in cooking and heating. The nature preserve is much closer than the firewood ga‐
thering area, and you contemplate cutting down a few protected trees even though you know it is
against the law. How morally wrong would it be for you to cut down these trees?

Emotion Block

CLIFFHANGER
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You are a construction worker. You and your crew are high on a scaffold, working on a skyscraper. Sud‐
denly, the scaffolding partially collapses. You and several others are hanging on to a dangling crossbar,
but it cannot hold all of your weight. The worker next to you slips off the crossbar and grabs a hold of
your one free arm. However, you realize that the entire structure is about to give way. The only way to
avoid you and everyone else falling to your deaths is to repeatedly kick your co‐ worker in the stomach
and chest until he lets go of your hand and falls to his certain death. This will remove just enough
weight that the rest of you can make it to safety before the scaffold collapses. How morally wrong
would it be for you to kill your co‐worker in order to save yourself and the rest of the crew?

BUS PLUNGE
You are the bus driver for a kindergarten field trip to the zoo. On the way, faulty tires cause the bus to
overturn and plunge off of a bridge and into a roaring river. You and three of the children are still in the
sinking bus, but the rest of the passengers have been swept away down the river to their deaths. You
grab the two children nearest to you and begin to swim toward the exit door. The third remaining child
grabs onto your leg. You realize that you are not strong enough to fight the current and swim with all
three children holding on to you. The only way to reach the surface before you and the children drown
is to shake the third child off of your leg. This will allow you to bring the two children to the surface with
you, but the third child will drown. How morally wrong would it be for you to shake the child off your
leg in order to save yourself and the two other children?

CRYING BABY
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and
some of your townspeople have sought refuge in two rooms of the cellar of a large house. Outside you
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hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby, who is with you
in the room, begins to cry loudly. You put your hand over his mouth to block the sound. If you remove
your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, the baby
and the others hiding in both rooms. To save yourself and the others you must keep your hand on his
mouth and smother your baby to death. How morally wrong would it be for you to smother your baby
in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?

GRAZING
You share a common area of grazing land with nine other ranchers. All the ranchers, including you,
know that the common grazing land is the perfect size for the total amount of cattle that you all collec‐
tively own. If any of the ranchers buy extra cattle over‐grazing would result, causing plant cover deple‐
tion, soil infertility and erosion, and the pollution of nearby waterways. The ranchers have an ‘unwrit‐
ten’ commitment not to overuse the common grazing land. You come across a special deal where you
can purchase a number of additional cattle for a very low price. This would cause your sales to go up
and increase product distribution to your buyers, as well as to the individual consumer. How morally
wrong would it be for you to purchase additional cattle?

Appendix B
Nonmoral Dilemmas
Control Block
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EUTHANASIA
You are the leader of a small group of soldiers, and all of you are out of ammunition. You are on your
way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of your men steps in a trap set by
the enemy. His leg is badly injured and caught in the trap. You cannot free him from this trap without
killing him. However, if you leave him behind, the enemy troops will find him and torture him to death.
This soldier begs you not to leave him behind to be cruelly tortured to death. The enemy troops are clos‐
ing in on your position. It is not safe for you or your men to remain with your trapped comrade any
longer. In order to prevent this man’s needless suffering at the hands of the enemy, you could kill him
yourself by stabbing him in the heart. How morally wrong would it be for you to stab this man in the
heart in order to prevent his needless suffering?

YELLOW PERCH IN LAKE MICHIGAN
In your community on Lake Michigan, commercial fishing of yellow perch is the major source of em‐
ployment. You are a supervisor at the Department of Natural Resources where you monitor these
perch. Through your position at the DNR, you have the power to issue citations and begin legal pro‐
ceedings. Recent reports state that the current rate of fishing for yellow perch is not sustainable. If
changes are not made to limit catches, the perch population will no longer be able to support commer‐
cial fishing. You discover the largest fishing distribution company in the area, Hastings & Brown, has
engaged in overly aggressive fishing. Though they deplete over half of the perch population, they pro‐
vide employment for hundreds of local residents. A citation from you could jeopardize local jobs, but
proceeding with it could preserve the yellow perch. The CEO of Hastings & Brown has offered you a
large sum of money to overlook the infraction. How morally wrong would it be to ignore this offer, and
fine the fishing company?
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
You are a member of Congress. The legislature is deciding on a new policy concerning national forests in
your state. A proposed bill outlines a plan to build a factory and research facility for scientists to devel‐
op potential cancer‐fighting treatments. Currently, the projected location of this factory is within a na‐
tional forest, a portion of which would need to be cleared if the factory were built. The clearance would
displace a thriving owl population. How morally wrong would it be for you to veto this bill in order to
preserve the owls and their habitat?

OVERPOPULATION
Human overpopulation is a major cause of animal species’ extinction. Indonesia has relocated people
from overcrowded islands like Java to forested areas, such as Borneo and western New Guinea. You
have recently relocated to Borneo and find your fellow immigrants burning the forests (at the encou‐
ragement of the Indonesian government) in order to create farms and grazing land for livestock. In the
process, they are driving endangered species, such as the Orangutan, toward extinction. You want to
make a new home for yourself in this new community, including friendships and sustainable living op‐
portunities. How morally wrong would it be for you to join your fellow immigrants in forest burning?

NUCLEAR WASTE
Ferry Creek Nuclear Plant has 1,550 metric tons of high‐level radioactive waste in elevated cooling pools
near the nuclear reactors. In the past, the accumulating waste has been moved into dry casks outside
the plant as a quick, but temporary, solution. This decision has allowed the plant to remain in operation
without interruption. However, if the casks were to break and a toxic spill to occur, the aftermath would
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lead to a total decimation of the local plant and animal life, in addition to poisoning the ground water. A
common practice in other countries reprocesses the waste, uses it again, and reduces the total amount
of waste produced. This practice conserves uranium, but it is not firmly regulated in the United States
and proceeding with it could attract the attention of federal authorities. You must guide the nuclear
plant executives as to which option is the best solution for dealing with the overwhelming amount of
accumulated waste. How morally wrong would it be for you to tell the executives to stick with their first
plan of moving the casks, filled with waste, outside the plant?

Fact Block

ROOF
You are negotiating with an armed and disturbed man on the roof of a building. Down below there is a
large crowd of people at the city’s art and music festival. He has just stated that he is going to start
shooting people in the crowd and then shoot himself and you are sure that you cannot talk him out of it.
The people in the large crowd below do not realize that he is a threat and you have no way to warn
them. From where he is standing, he could easily kill a dozen or more people before the crowd ran to
safety, not counting those who would be trampled in the chaos. However, given your position, you could
run over and shove him off the roof of the building before he starts shooting at people in the crowd.
The lives of many others will be spared by this act. How morally wrong would it be for you to shove this
man off the roof to save the lives of other people?

OIL
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Following a recent earthquake, a large Danish research institute, RKT, has discovered natural oil re‐
sources in the North Sea located just underneath the ocean floor. The profit that the community could
make from drilling these oil reserves could be re‐invested in the fishing and tourism industries, thus im‐
proving the quality of life for many locals. As a representative of RKT, you possess reports indicating
that drilling will definitely release oil into the sea and pollute the surrounding waters within a month.
The consequences for the ecosystem would be devastating, and would lead to the deaths of many ma‐
rine animals. How morally wrong would it be for you to share this information and stop the excavation
of the discovered oil?

OLD GROWTH
Up until recently a large area of old growth forest has been set aside as parkland in a small town in Brit‐
ish Columbia. Now the local lumber company Queensland Trees Inc., which owns the forest, is planning
a clear‐cut harvest of the old growth trees. It has been a low period for the town, and this new project
means jobs and income for a number of years. You have lived in this town all your life. Most of your
friends and previous co‐workers are very excited about the new harvest and want to see the project
happen. Both you and your spouse were recently laid off by Queensland, though you expect to be re‐
hired when this new harvest begins. However, you have learned that about 98% of old growth forests in
North America have already been destroyed and that the unique old growth ecosystem is home to many
rare species that cannot survive in other habitats. How morally wrong would it be for you to oppose the
harvest?

KAOLIN CRISIS
For the past 150 years, Monroeville has been a factory town and has mined kaolin, a chalky white min‐
eral. Miners dig huge holes in the land to acquire this substance because it is located many feet under‐
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ground. Recently the quality of the kaolin has decreased making it more expensive to mine and clean.
Town elders wonder what new factory could provide the same jobs to the town, given the inevitable
demise of the kaolin industry. Some townspeople have suggested that the land, previously excavated
for the kaolin, should be filled and used to build a large agricultural industry for the community. Begin‐
ning to farm this land would not only allow employment to be maintained, but provide another food
resource. Mining executives would prefer to repurpose the factory and equipment in order to mine
gypsum, a less valuable mineral, so that the pre‐existing jobs, equipment, and basic infrastructure can
be maintained. Extraction of gypsum is similar to that of kaolin. You are a city council member and
must vote on the best option for your town. How morally wrong would it be for you to vote to keep the
factory open for mining purposes?

Emotion Block

ENEMY SPY
You are an officer in the military during a war. Your soldiers have found a high‐ranking enemy spy
trapped and injured inside of a partially collapsed building. You have been informed over the radio that
a large group of enemy soldiers is planning a surprise attack on one of several nearby towns. These sol‐
diers will kill all the civilians in the town if you and your soldiers do not stop them, but you do not know
which town they plan to attack. You have questioned the trapped spy who is high ranking and surely
knows these plans, but he has refused to tell you which town is the target of the impending enemy at‐
tack. He will die soon from his many injuries. You could begin to beat, burn, cut, and otherwise painfully
torture him in order to force him to reveal this information. He would die from this painful torture, but
you and your soldiers could then protect the town from the surprise attack, saving hundreds of innocent
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lives. How morally wrong would it be for you to torture and kill this enemy spy in order to protect one
of the nearby towns?

CAR OR TRAIN
You have plans to go to Six Flags this weekend, so you are considering how to get there. Public transpor‐
tation costs $2 each way, and it will take you close to 90 minutes to reach your destination. If you drive,
it will take you half as much time to get there and back, increasing convenience and comfort, but will
cost approximately $10 in gas. Public transportation is operated primarily by electricity. Using it reduces
the amount of greenhouse gases emitted by your trip, however the travel‐time is less convenient. How
morally wrong would it be for you to drive to Six Flags instead of taking public transportation?

GARBAGE
A region in the Midwest has a beautiful nature preserve which supports a diverse ecosystem of native
plant and animal species. This region has a problem with proper disposal of residents’ garbage because
the landfill is almost filled to capacity. The waste management council has developed two equally effec‐
tive proposals to deal with the waste overflow. Proposal 1 states a second landfill should be sited on the
nature preserve, completely destroying its ecosystem. Proposal 2 outlines a new collection system that
would force residents to separate their garbage into 7 categories: 6 for recycling and 1 for composting.
Residents would be subject to substantial fines if they refused to abide by the recycling/composting reg‐
ulations, as described in Proposal 2. You will participate in a local vote on this issue next week. How mo‐
rally wrong would it be for you to vote for implementing the new collection system instead of building
the new landfill?

LAKE FOR HOMES
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Lake Wassily is a popular place for recreation and is considered the town “hotspot”. Due to climate
changes, the lake has stagnated attracting malaria‐carrying mosquitoes to the area. Residents near the
lake are at serious risk for contracting this disease, as one resident has already been infected. The CDC
is advising the town to consult with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding a new, effec‐
tive, and environmentally safe way to eliminate the malaria‐threat. This approach would put a financial
strain on the city therefore the taxes of all city residents would need to be raised slightly. A large real
estate agency has approached government officials and suggested they drain the lake to sell plots of
land to individual homeowners. The malaria‐threat would be neutralized, and the town would make
(not spend) money. You currently live near the lake and would welcome the new homes in the area be‐
cause they would increase the property value of your home. However, you would no longer enjoy the
leisure and beauty of this lake if it were converted to a residential neighborhood. How morally wrong
would it be for you to sign a petition to ask the town government to consult the EPA and preserve the
lake?

